This study addresses optimal information allocation in team production. We present a unique implementation problem of desirable effort levels and show that, under certain conditions, it is optimal to asymmetrically inform the agents even if they are ex ante symmetric. The main intuition is that the asymmetric information allocation is effective in avoiding "bad" equilibria, that is, equilibria with coordination failure. This analysis provides an explanation as to why informing agents asymmetrically might be beneficial in improving the agents' coordination behaviors.
Introduction
This paper examines an optimal information allocation among agents in an organization. In many types of organizations (such as firms, universities, and communities), agents are often asymmetrically informed. For example, certain information is often retained within a subset of managers in a company even if the information is relevant to the entire company. Managers of company-owned chain stores are typically exposed to more information through periodic meetings compared to franchisees. Explaining such phenomena requires an understanding of the key channels through which information structure affects organizational performance.
If agents engage in different tasks or have different characteristics, trivial situations would occur where an asymmetric information structure arises naturally. However, this paper establishes a novel channel between information allocation and implementation cost that implies that an asymmetric information structure among the agents is optimal, even when the agents are completely symmetric in terms of their characteristics and the tasks in which they engage. We interpret this channel as a source of "intrinsic" motivation for asymmetric information allocation in an organization.
Specifically, we consider the following team production model based on Holmstrom (1982) . 1 Two agents engage in a single project, and each of the agents chooses a binary effort (high/low or work/shirk). The principal, a residual claimant, offers a bonus contract contingent on the binary outcome of the project (success/failure). The success probability of the project depends on the agents' total efforts and the binary state of the world (good/bad). We assume that the failure of the project is extremely hazardous (e.g., accidents in a nuclear power plant or loss of a brand's long-term reputation). In such a situation, we believe it is reasonable to require that the optimal contract admits a unique (Bayesian) equilibrium such that every agent chooses a desired level of effort in every state. 2 As a direct predecessor, in the team production context but without uncertain state variables, Winter (2004) studies optimal bonus contracts that uniquely implement the desired effort choices and shows the optimality of an asymmetric bonus contract even if the agents are symmetric. This paper considers a similar model but with uncertain parameters in the production function. This introduces a novel dimension to the principal's design problem, namely, the allocation of information among the agents. 3 The key observation is that asymmetric information allocation can significantly mitigate the agents' coordination failure. To provide a rough intuition, consider the following numerical example.
Example 1. Each agent earns, regardless of the state of the world, an expected payoff "3" if both agents work, "2" if a specific agent shirks but the other works, and "1" if he works but the other shirks. In the case where both agents shirk, the agent's expected payoff is "0" if the state is good, and "3" if the state is bad (see Table 1 below). 4 ("good") work shirk work (5, 5) (1, 2) shirk (2, 1) (0, 0) ("bad") work shirk work (5, 5) (1, 2) shirk (2, 1) (3, 3)
Each state is equally likely and, hence, if no agent is informed about the state, then "both work" and "both shirk" are equilibria, which is not desirable for the principal. 5 Informing both agents about the state is not 2 It is a common practice in the literature to focus on the implementation of such a "high-effort" equilibrium to simplify the analysis. We consider the unique implementation of such a desired equilibrium given the concerns in the literature for multiple-equilibrium problems (e.g., Mookherjee (1984) ). We discuss this in more detail in Section 2. 3 We discuss how the asymmetry of bonus contracts and the asymmetry of information allocation interact in Section 5.1. 4 One can interpret these numbers as the agents' expected utilities given an arbitrary bonus contract fixed. 5 Of course, if the principal employs wishful thinking and believes that both will work, 3 desirable either because "both shirk" is again an equilibrium in the bad state.
Nevertheless, informing just one agent can eliminate this bad coordination. Specifically, suppose that only agent 2 is informed about the state, whereas agent 1 is not (but agent 1 knows that agent 2 knows the state, and so on). First, if the state is good, then it is dominant for agent 2 to work. Given this, it is now (iteratively) dominant for agent 1 to work, as illustrated in the following table:
work in both states work only in good state work (5, 5) (3, 5 2 ) (= ( 5+1 2 , 5+2 2 )) shirk
(2, 1) ( 5 2 , 2) (= ( 2+3 2 , 1+3 2 )) Finally, given that agent 1 works (in any state), it is (iteratively) dominant for agent 2 to work even in the bad state. Therefore, the desired outcome that "both work in every state" is the unique strategy profile that survives iterative elimination of dominated strategies.
The conclusion in this example may seem somewhat ad hoc. For example, a bonus contract that generates these numbers may not be the optimal contract. Nevertheless, the example illustrates an important observation that the bad coordination outcome (i.e., both shirking) becomes less sustainabale in an equilibrium by asymmetrically informing the agents. 6 The aim of then the principal does not foresee a problem. However, in case project failure is hazardous, the principal may adopts a more pessimistic view. 6 The problem of information disclosure by the principal is also studied in mechanism design, such as in Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007) and Esó and Szentes (2007) . Particularly, Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007) show that asymmetrically informing bidders (agents) in auction may be optimal for the revenue-maximizing seller (principal). In their paper, more information implies that the auction outcome becomes more efficient, which itself induces more revenue through bidders' bidding behaviors, but it also implies that the bidders enjoy more information rent. Our paper shows that providing information asymmetrically can be useful in eliminating undesirable equilibria in a team production setting, and in this sense, our paper features a different aspect of providing information asymmetrically to the agents.
this paper is to show that this novel intuition holds in more general team production environments. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, and Section 3 studies the optimal bonus contract and information structure in a simple two-agent case with anonymous contracts. Sections 4 and 5 examine several extensions and generalizations of the base model in Section 3 with respect to the number of agents (Section 4.1), asymmetry in agents' efforts costs (Section 4.2), and elaborate contracts such as non-anonymous (or individual-specific) bonus contracts (Section 5.1) and stochastic information allocation (Section 5.2). Section 6 concludes the paper. Except for those in Section 3, all proofs are shown in the Appendix.
Model
We consider a team production model with one manager (a principal) and n workers (agents) who engage in a project. Each worker i ∈ {1, . . . , n} simultaneously chooses an effort level e i ∈ {0, 1}, which costs ce i for c > 0. The profit of the project is y ∈ {S, F } (S > F), and p θ (x) denotes the probability of success (y = S), which depends on the agents' total effort x = i e i and task environment θ ∈ {H, L}. We assume that p θ (x) is increasing in x for any θ. The probability that θ = H is f ∈ (0, 1), and the probability that θ = L is 1 − f . Let p φ (x) = fp H (x) + (1 − f )p L (x) denote the mean success probability given x.
The marginal productivity of effort, denoted by ∆p θ (x) ≡ p θ (x) − p θ (x − 1), satisfies (i) ∆p H (x) > ∆p L (x) for all x and (ii) ∆p θ (x) > ∆p θ (x−1) for all x and θ. The first condition requires that the marginal productivity is always higher in state H than in state L, and the second condition requires that the agents' efforts are complementary and, therefore, the agents' collaboration is important for success. 7
Information structure The principal can organize the information structure of the team. Except for Section 5.2, this simply refers to how many agents are informed of θ when they make effort choices. 8 Specifically, we compare the following three types of information structure.
• No information (NI): no agent observes θ,
• Asymmetric information (AI): agent i ∈ {1, . . . , m} does not observe θ, but agent j ∈ {m + 1, . . . , n} observes θ,
• Full information (FI): all agents observe θ.
Let s i ∈ S i = {H, L, φ} represent agent i's information about the state. More specifically, (i) if he is informed, then s i = θ for each θ, and (ii) if he is uninformed, then s i = φ for each θ. Hence, agent i's strategy is to choose e i (s i ) ∈ {0, 1} for each s i .
Once the principal chooses an information structure, we assume that this structure itself becomes common knowledge among the agents. We also assume that the principal commits to the information structure of the team without knowing the realization of θ. 9
Contract Except for Section 5.1, we consider anonymous bonus contracts where all the agents are paid symmetrically. Specifically, an anonymous bonus contract is represented by b ≥ 0, where each agent is paid 0 if y = F , 8 An essentially equivalent formulation is that the principal controls the cost of acquiring information on θ. Specifically, the cost is set as zero for an agent whom the principal wants to inform, and it is set to infinity for an agent whom the principal does not want to inform. This assumption contrasts with the literature on information acquisition in moral hazard environments. For example, Andreoni (2006) and Kobayashi and Suehiro (2005) study models of endogenous leadership or leadership battles, where each agent chooses whether to acquire certain information on the environment to influence other agents as a leader.
9 The results of the paper would not qualitatively change even if the bonus contract is contingent on the realized θ (i.e., b becomes a function of θ rather than a scalar invariant in θ), as long as the principal can commit to the information structure and the (possibly contingent) bonus contract before observing θ. and each agent is paid a bonus b if y = S. 10 In Section 5.1, we examine how the results would change if the principal can offer different contracts to different agents. Given bonus b and the agents' effort profile e = (e 1 , . . . , e n ) ∈ {0, 1} N ,
F . We assume that S is much larger than F so that the principal's objective is to implement the full effort strategy of the agents, that is, (e i (s i )) i,s i such that e i (s i ) = 1 for every i and s i .
Given bonus b and the agents' effort profile e = (e 1 , . . . , e n ) ∈ {0, 1} N , agent i's payoff in state θ is u i (e, θ; b) = bp θ ( N j=1 e j ) − ce i . Thus, given the information structure, the agents' strategy profile e = (e i (s i )) i,s i is a (purestrategy Bayesian) equilibrium if (i) for each i who is informed: for each θ ∈ {H, L} and e ′ i ∈ {0, 1},
and (ii) for each i who is uninformed: for each e ′ i ∈ {0, 1},
Benchmark: Full-effort strategy profile as one of the equilibria We first derive the optimal contract that makes the full-effort strategy profile one of the equilibria and observe that the no-information scenario is the optimal information structure. Under the no-information scenario, the full-effort strategy profile is an equilibrium if bp φ (n) − c ≥ bp φ (n − 1) or, equivalently, b ≥ c ∆p φ (n) . Thus, the optimal contract is b = c ∆p φ (n) . Under any other information structure, the bonus must be sufficiently high so that an informed agent works in the low 10 Alternatively, we define an anonymous bonus contract by a pair (b, w) where each agent is paid w if y = F , and each agent is paid b + w if y = S. When the agents are protected by limited liability so that a feasible contract must satisfy w ≥ 0 and b + w ≥ 0, then, as in the standard argument, we focus on bonus contracts with w = 0 without loss of generality to seek optimal contracts. 7 state, that is, bp L (n) − c ≥ bp L (n − 1) or, equivalently, b ≥ c ∆p L (n) . Thus, the optimal contract is b = c ∆p L (n) > 1 ∆p φ (n) . Therefore, the no-information scenario dominates any other information structure. Intuitively, this is because we must incentivize the agents based on the average state under the no-information structure, whereas under any other information structure we must incentivize informed agents for every state.
Incentive-inducing contract The contract that implements the full-effort strategy profile only as one of the equilibria implicitly assumes that the agents would play the best equilibrium in view of the principal, even if there are multiple equilibria given the contract. However, in case the failure of the project is extremely hazardous (e.g., accidents in a nuclear power plant, or loss of a brand's long-term reputation), the principal may not want to follow such a wishful thinking. Rather, it may be more reasonable to require that the full-effort strategy profile is a unique equilibrium.
Potential multiple equilibria have been an important topic in the literature. 11 According to Kreps (1990) , the equilibrium played is determined by the "corporate culture." 12 Unless the principal can fully control the culture within an organization, undesirable equilibria may be selected. Given this concern, we consider the problem of making the desired equilibria a unique equilibrium, so that the desired outcome is "guaranteed", independent of the corporate culture.
There are several studies that derive the optimal mechanism that uniquely implements the desired effort choice. Ma (1988) shows that a mechanism with communication can eliminate undesirable equilibria without any additional cost if the agents' outputs are individually observed. However, in 11 See, for example, Mookherjee (1984) for general moral hazard environments. See also Baliga and Sjostrom (1998) for the study of collusive behaviors in moral hazard environments.
12 See Hermalin (2012) for a survey of the literature of corporate culture. In empirical studies, Cronqvist, Low, and Nilsson (2007) argue that corporate culture may be a key determinant of the long-term tendency of corporate policies and performance.
team-production models as in Holmstrom (1982) , the agents' outputs are not individually observed (instead, only the aggregate output is observed). Therefore, we cannot directly apply the mechanism in Ma (1988) . 13 Winter (2004) considers a team-production model without state uncertainty and derives the optimal bonus contracts that uniquely implement the full-effort strategy profile. In this sense, our approach is closest to that of Winter (2004) , although we allow for state uncertainty. Following Winter (2004) , we assume that b is an incentive-inducing contract (for the full-effort strategy profile) if (i) the full-effort strategy profile is an equilibrium given b, and (ii) any other strategy profile is not an equilibrium. Our goal is to identify the minimum (or the infimum) bonus that uniquely implements the full-effort strategy profile and to study how it varies among different information structures.
Remark. In some applications, the entity that engages in information allocation (principal) may have limited ability to design b. For example, consider research collaboration between two junior researchers (agents) working on a joint project, and a senior researcher (principal) engages in information allocation. In such a case, the senior researcher may not fully control b, the prizes for successful outcomes (such as publication or future promotion). As another example, consider multiple investors (agents) and a startup company (principal), where the startup has information concerning its potential for success. The startup may have limited ability to control b through the design of financial contracts. In such cases, our results can be interpreted as providing the region of b where unique implementation is possible (given each information structure). Our comparison of various information structures is completely valid if we say that one information structure is better than another if and only if the region of b, where unique implementation is possible in the first information structure, is larger than the region of b in the second structure.
Baseline case
We first study the case where there are only two agents. In Sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, we identify the cost of uniquely implementing the full-effort strategy profile under each information structure. Then, in Section 3.4, we examine the optimal information structure and perform comparative statics.
No information
In the no-information scenario where neither agent is informed, the optimal bonus contract that implements e = (1, 1) as one of the equilibria is b = c ∆p φ (2) . However, under this contract, not only e = (1, 1), but also other effort choices could be an equilibrium. In fact, if i chooses e i = 0, then it is (strictly) optimal for j to choose e j = 0 and, thus, e = (0, 0) is another equilibrium given this contract. 14 Therefore, the optimal bonus level that uniquely implements e = (1, 1) must be strictly greater than c ∆p φ (2) . Specifically, for e = (0, 0) to not be an equilibrium, we must have b > c ∆p φ (1) (> c ∆p φ (2) ) so that an agent works even if the other agent does not work. Now, given b > c ∆p φ (1) , a high effort is dominant for each agent and, hence, e = (0, 0) and any other effort choice (except for e = (1, 1)) cannot be an equilibrium. Therefore, the optimal bonus level that uniquely implements e = (1, 1) is c ∆p φ (1) . 15 Thus, we obtain the following.
Proposition 1. Under the no-information scenario, the optimal bonus is b NI = c ∆p φ (1) .
Asymmetric information
We now consider the asymmetric-information scenario where only one of the agents (for example, agent 2) is informed and the other agent (agent 1) is not. The optimal bonus level is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Under the asymmetric-information scenario, the optimal bonus is b AI = max
Proof. We first show the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let b be any bonus contract such that neither (0, (0, 0)), (0, (1, 0)),
Proof. First, to prevent (0, (0, 0)) from being an equilibrium, we must have
(1, 0)) from being an equilibrium, we must have b > c ∆p L (2) .
Note that b >b is a necessary condition for uniquely implementing the full-effort profile (1, (1, 1)). Now we show that, conversely, (1, (1, 1)) is uniquely implemented by any b such that b >b. First, because b > c ∆p H (1) , it is strictly dominant for the informed agent to make a high effort in state H.
, it is (iteratively) strictly dominant for the uninformed agent to make a high effort. Given this, because b > c ∆p L (2) , it is (iteratively) strictly dominant for the informed agent to make a high effort even in state L. Therefore, (1, (1, 1)) is the unique strategy profile that survives iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies and, hence, it is a unique equilibrium.
Full information
Finally, we consider the case where both of the agents are informed. In this case, it is necessary to incentivize an agent to make a high effort in any state, even if the other agent does not work. Therefore, the bonus must be at least c ∆p L (1) . Given such a bonus level, it is dominant for each agent to choose a high effort in any state. Hence, the full-effort strategy profile becomes the unique equilibrium. Thus, we obtain the following.
Proposition 3. Under the full-information scenario, the optimal bonus is b F I = c ∆p L (1) .
Optimal information structure
In this subsection, we compare the three information structures discussed above. Recall that b NI = c ∆p φ (1) is the bonus level that incentivizes an agent to work in the average state even if the other agent does not work, whereas b F I = c ∆p L (1) is the bonus level that incentivizes an agent to work in any state even if the other agent does not work. We have b NI < b F I and, hence, the no-information scenario is optimal compared to the full-information scenario.
Whether the no-information scenario is better than the asymmetric-information scenario, or vice versa, depends on the parameter values .
Theorem 1. The no-information scenario is always better than the fullinformation scenario. The asymmetric-information scenario is better than the no-information scenario if and only if
Proof. We only prove the second statement.
, then the no-information scenario is never optimal because
The proposition shows that, first, allocating information asymmetrically can be better than no information (and than full information). It also shows that no information can be better than asymmetric information
, b AI becomes higher than b NI (i.e., the no-information scenario becomes better) as (i) the "effort effect" on the production function measured by ∆p L (2) − ∆p L (1) becomes smaller, and (ii) the "state effect" measured by ∆p H (1)−∆p L (1) becomes larger (see Figure 1 ). This is because (i) if the effort effect is smaller, which means that the complementarity of the agents' efforts in success probability is smaller, then the concern of potential coordination failure is smaller, and therefore, the benefit of asymmetric information allocation is smaller. On the other hand, (ii) if the state effect is larger, then it is costly to incentivize an informed agent in the low state, and therefore, informing no agent is likely to be better. 
Extensions
The basic model examined in the previous section is extended in two directions. In Section 4.1, we assume there are n agents. The main conclusion remains similar, but we argue that with more agents, asymmetric information tends to be better than no information, in a certain sense. The main questions are: How many agents should be informed, and how does this optimal number of informed agents vary with the parameters? In Section 4.2, we consider a case where the agents have different effort costs. The analysis provides some insights for which agents should be informed under asymmetric information allocation. The analysis also shows how the optimal information structure varies with the cost difference across agents.
n-agent case
This subsection considers the model where a team consists of n agents. Let b m denote the optimal bonus when m(≤ n) agents are uninformed and m − n agents are informed. First, we observe that under the no-information and full-information scenarios, the optimal bonus has a similar property as in Section 3 in that the optimal bonus level is at exactly the level above which an agent is incentivized to work even if no agent works (in the average state and in every state, respectively).
Proposition 4. Under the no-information scenario, the optimal bonus is b n = c ∆p φ (1) .
Similarly, under the full-information scenario, the optimal bonus is b 0 = c ∆p L (1) . Next, we provide the optimal bonus under the asymmetric-information scenario, i.e., with 1 ≤ m ≤ n − 1.
Proposition 5. Under the asymmetric-information scenario where m agents are uninformed and n − m agents are informed, the optimal bonus is b m = max{
Now, we consider how many agents should be informed or uninformed among n agents. Let m * ∈ {0, . . . , n} denote the optimal number of uninformed agents (i.e., b m * ≤ b m for any m ̸ = m * ). We provide some general properties concerning m * .
The no-information scenario is optimal if and only if
The first statement shows that full information is never optimal. The second statement implies that the minimizer of b m , m * , smoothly varies with the parameter values. The second statement also implies that the no-information scenario (i.e., m = 0) is optimal if and only if b m is (globally) decreasing in m. Therefore, as a corollary of the second statement, we obtain the third statement, which is analogous to the condition in Theorem 1 in the base model. As the effort effect ∆p L (n) − ∆p L (1) increases relative to the state effect ∆p H (1) − ∆p L (1), asymmetric information becomes more advantageous. Notice that the effort-effect term ∆p L (n) − ∆p L (1) is increasing in n, while the state-effect term ∆p H (1) − ∆p L (1) is not. Therefore, adding more agents in the team (without changing the success probability function) makes asymmetric information more likely be optimal.
Asymmetric effort cost
In this subsection, we allow the agents to have different effort costs. The main objective of the analysis is to study which agent should be informed if the agents have different characteristics.
We consider the same model as that of the base model in Section 2, except that each agent i incurs cost c i for e i = 1. Assume c 1 < c 2 , whereby agent 1 is more "productive" than agent 2. Because of this change, under the asymmetric-information scenario, we consider two cases separately: one where the productive agent 1 is informed, and the other where the unproductive agent 2 is informed.
We first consider the no-information scenario.
Proposition 6. Under the no-information scenario, the optimal bonus is
As long as c 1 and c 2 are close to each other, we have b NI = c1 ∆p φ (1) , that is, the condition of avoiding the low effort equilibrium binds. However, when the cost difference becomes sufficiently large, the incentive condition for the non-productive agent starts to bind.
We omit the full-information case because the intuition is similar to the no-information case.
Next, we consider the asymmetric-information scenario. An interesting question is which agent (productive or unproductive) should be informed. The answer depends on the parameter values. Intuitively, it is better to inform the productive agent if the optimal bonus is determined by the informed agent's incentive conditions, and vice versa. Specifically, first assume that c 1 and c 2 are close to each other. Recall that, in the base model (with c 1 = c 2 = c), the optimal bonus under the asymmetric-information scenario b AI is the greatest of c ∆p H (1) , c ∆p L (2) , and 2) , this implies that the optimal bonus is determined by one of the incentive conditions of the informed agent. Therefore, if c 1 is (slightly) smaller than c 2 , it is optimal to inform the productive agent, agent 1.
If
, this implies that the optimal bonus is determined by the incentive condition of the uninformed agent. Therefore, if c 1 is (slightly) smaller than c 2 , it is optimal to inform the unproductive agent, agent 2.
Therefore, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 7. Assume that the cost difference is sufficiently small so that 
where the productive agent 1 is informed, and b 2 AI = max{
where the unproductive agent 2 is informed.
When the cost difference is sufficiently large to satisfy c1 c2 < γ * , the noinformation scenario outperforms the asymmetric-information scenario (regardless of who is informed). Therefore, we do not derive the optimal bonus contract under asymmetric information in such a case. 16 The following result characterizes the optimal information structure.
Theorem 3. When c1 c2 < γ * , the no-information scenario is better than the asymmetric-information scenario.
When c1 c2 ≥ γ * , 17 the no-information scenario is better than the asymmetricinformation scenario if and only if
Again, when the cost difference is small, then the result is qualitatively similar to the base case (although the expressions are more complicated), whereas when the cost difference is large, then the potential advantage of asymmetric information is lost and, hence, a symmetric information structure is better.
Elaborate contracts
The previous sections only consider symmetric bonus contracts and deterministic information allocation. Although we believe that both features are reasonable restrictions in practice, it is theoretically interesting to investigate whether the main results under those restrictions still hold even if they are relaxed. The full characterization of the optimal contract and information allocation without any restriction is beyond the scope of the paper, and we leave this to future research. 16 The intuition is roughly as follows. When the cost difference is large, the optimal bonus becomes one whereby (regardless of who is informed) the productive agent is incentivized to work in any state even if the unproductive agent does not work. In such a case, however, the no-information scenario becomes better than the asymmetric-information scenario (regardless of who is informed).
17 Note that this implies c1 ∆pφ(1) ≥ c2 ∆pφ(2) and, hence, the optimal bonus under the no-information scenario is b NI = c1 ∆pφ(1) .
Individual Bonus
In this subsection, we allow for the contracts that are not necessarily anonymous (which we refer to as individual bonus contracts). The main qualitative result stays the same: informing the agents asymmetrically can be optimal in minimizing the agency cost. However, the interaction of individual bonuses and information allocation adds a new dimension for the analysis. For example, we observe that asymmetric information allocation and asymmetric bonus schemes are "(imperfect) substitutes" for the principal in the sense that the set of parameters under which asymmetric information allocation is optimal becomes smaller under individual bonus contracts than under symmetric bonus contracts. The main objective of this subsection is to provide the intuition for this substitution effect. An individual bonus contract is represented by a pair (b 1 , b 2 ) ∈ R 2 + such that each agent i is paid zero if y = F , and each agent is paid b i if y = S. We aim to characterize the optimal incentive-inducing contract by minimizing b 1 + b 2 among all contracts that uniquely implement the full-effort strategy profile.
If we allow for individual-specific bonus contracts, the optimal contract is typically asymmetric, as found by Winter (2004) in the context of team production without the state uncertainty. In the no-information scenario and full-information scenario in our model, the result directly applies as follows.
Proposition 8. Under the no-information scenario, the optimal bonus contract is
).
Similarly, under the full-information scenario, the optimal bonus contract is
To provide some intuition for the optimal bonus contract under the noinformation scenario (and a similar intuition applies to the full-information case), consider a bonus contract that uniquely implements e = (1, 1). To prevent e = (0, 0) from being an equilibrium, such a contract must give c ∆p φ (1) to one of the agents, for example, agent 1, so that agent 1 would work even if agent 2 does not work. As opposed to anonymous contracts, we do not need to give c ∆p φ (1) to both of the agents. In fact, for agent 2, we only need to give c ∆p φ (2) so that he would work if agent 1 works. Therefore, the optimal contract is as given in the proposition.
In the asymmetric-information scenario, the optimal individual-bonus contract is given as follows.
Proposition 9. Under the asymmetric-information scenario, the optimal bonus contract b AI is the one that minimizes the total bonus payment among
Consider a bonus contract that uniquely implements e = (1, (1, 1) ). To prevent e = (0, (0, 0)) from being an equilibrium, such a contract must give either (i) c ∆p φ (1) to the uninformed agent or (ii) c ∆p H (1) to the informed agent. In Case (i), working becomes dominant for the uninformed agent and, hence, we must give c ∆p L (2) to uniquely implement e = (1, (1, 1) ) because, then, the informed agent has an incentive to work in any state given that the uninformed agent works. The total bonus in such a contract is thus c ∆p φ (1) + c ∆p L (2) . In Case (ii), working becomes dominant for the informed agent in state H. To prevent (0, (1, 0)) from being an equilibrium, we must give either (iia) c ∆p L (1) to the informed agent so that working becomes dominant for the informed agent in any state, or (ii-b) c f ∆p H (2)+(1−f )∆p L (1) to the uninformed agent so that he has an incentive to work given that the informed agent works in state H.
In Case (ii-a), we must give c ∆p φ (2) to uniquely implement e = (1, (1, 1) ) because, then, the uninformed agent has an incentive to work given that the informed agent works in any state. The total bonus in such a contract is, thus, c ∆p φ (2) + c ∆p L (1) . In Case (ii-b), we must give c ∆p L (2) to the informed agent so that the agent works in state L. Thus, in Case (ii-b), the bonus to the informed agent is max{ c ∆p H (1) , c ∆p L (2) } and, therefore, the total bonus in such a contract is
}. Now, we compare the three information structures.
Theorem 4. The no-information scenario is better than the full-information scenario. The asymmetric-information scenario is better than the no-information scenario if and only if 1
As in the anonymous-contract case, the no-information scenario is better than the asymmetric-information scenario when (i) the effort effect, measured by ∆p θ (2) − ∆p θ (1), θ = H, L, is sufficiently small (so that the concern for potential coordination failure is small) and (ii) the state effect, measured by ∆p H (x) − ∆p L (x), x = 1, 2, is sufficiently large (so that the incentive cost for an informed agent is large).
However, with individual contracts, the no-information scenario is better in the opposite case as well, that is, when (i) the effort effect is sufficiently large and (ii) the state effect is sufficiently small (see Figure 2) . The main reason for this difference is that, with individual contracts, we can save the implementation cost by making the bonus payment asymmetric. When the effort effect is large and the state effect is small, the amount of this cost saving is more significant under the no-information scenario than under the asymmetric-information scenario, which makes the total bonus payment smaller under the no-information scenario.
To see this more formally, recall that, with anonymous contracts, the optimal bonus level under the no-information scenario is c ∆p φ (1) , whereas under the asymmetric-information scenario, the optimal bonus level is max{
Thus, the difference of the two terms converges to zero as the state effect goes to zero, that is, as ∆p H (x) − ∆p L (x) goes to zero for each x = 1, 2. Now, if individual contracts are allowed, then, under the no-information scenario, we can save the total bonus payment compared to the anonymous-bonus case by
which does not vanish even if the state effect goes to zero (and it is larger when the effort effect is larger). On the other hand, under the asymmetricinformation scenario, we can save the total bonus payment compared to the anonymous-bonus case by
which converges to zero as the state effect goes to zero. Therefore, when the state effect is sufficiently small and the effort effect is sufficiently large, the no-information scenario becomes better.
Stochastic information allocation
In the previous sections, only "deterministic" information allocation is considered, that is, each agent is either perfectly informed of θ or not informed at all. However, at least theoretically, we can consider more general "stochastic" information allocations. The complete characterization of the optimal stochastic information allocation is beyond the scope of this paper. 18 Instead, this subsection shows two partial characterization results. First, as soon as stochastic information allocation is allowed, the no-information scenario (in fact, any (possibly stochastic) "symmetric" information allocation) becomes suboptimal for any parameter values. Therefore, the optimal information allocation is necessarily asymmetric. Second, under certain parameter values, deterministic asymmetric information allocation (as in Section 3) is optimal, even if arbitrary stochastic information allocation is allowed.
In the two-agent setting considered in Section 3, a stochastic information allocation is denoted by (S 1 , S 2 , µ) where S i is an arbitrary finite set for i = 1, 2 and denotes the set of the signals agent i receives (before choosing his effort level), and µ : Θ → ∆(S 1 × S 2 ) is such that, for each θ ∈ Θ and (s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ S 1 × S 2 , µ(s 1 , s 2 |θ) represents the probability that each agent i receives signal s i when the state is θ. and µ is a joint probability distribution over Θ × S 1 × S 2 . In the most general setting, the principal can choose 18 A potential challenge for the complete characterization is that the standard technique in the Bayesian persuasion literature (e.g., Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) ) is not directly applicable. Some results in Bayesian persuasion crucially depend on the assumption that receivers (agents) play the best equilibrium with respect to the sender (principal) if there are multiple equilibria, whereas in our paper the key driving force for optimal information allocation is the concern that the agents may play a "bad" equilibrium if there are multiple equilibria.
an arbitrary S i for each i and arbitrary µ under the feasibility constraint that the marginal of µ over Θ coincides with the common prior. As special cases, the deterministic allocations considered in the previous sections are in this class. For example, the no-information scheme is identified by a singleton S i = {∅} for every i, and µ coincides with the common prior. (Deterministic) asymmetric information is identified by S 1 = {∅}, S 2 = Θ, µ(∅, H|H) = µ(∅, L|L) = 1. However, in general, more complicated information allocations are allowed here.
Agent i's strategy is given by e i : S i → {0, 1}, and the full-effort strategy profile is e = (e 1 , e 2 ) such that e i (s i ) = 1 for all i, s i .
Given a (symmetric) bonus contract b ∈ R + , a strategy profile e is a (pure-strategy Bayesian) equilibrium if, for each i, s i ∈ S i and e i ∈ {0, 1},
where E[·|s i ] represents the conditional (on s i ) expected-value operator with respect to s −i and θ induced by µ. We say that b uniquely implements the full-effort strategy profile if the full-effort strategy profile is the unique equilibrium given b.
First, as soon as stochastic information allocation is allowed, any symmetric information allocation (including no information as a special case) becomes suboptimal for any parameter values. We say that (S 1 , S 2 , µ) is symmetric if (i) S 1 = S 2 and (ii) s 1 ̸ = s 2 implies µ(s 1 , s 2 |H) = µ(s 1 , s 2 |L) = 0. That is, the agents do not have asymmetric information in such an information allocation rule. The following result implies that the optimal information structure is necessarily asymmetric among the class of stochastic information allocation.
Theorem 5. There exist sn (asymmetric) stochastic information allocation that is strictly better than any symmetric information allocation.
Next, under certain parameter values, deterministic asymmetric information allocation (as in Section 3) is optimal, even if arbitrary stochastic information allocation is allowed. Theorem 6. If ∆p H (1) < ∆p L (2) and ∆p H (1) < f∆p H (2) + (1 − f )p L (1), then (deterministic) asymmetric information allocation is optimal.
Note that under the conditions in the statement, b AI = c ∆p H (1) . The conditions are satisfied if the effort effect is sufficiently large, that is, when the concern for potential coordination failure is large. In this case, we have shown in Section 3 that asymmetric information is better than no information (and full information). The result is strengthened because asymmetric information is proven to be better than any other, possibly stochastic, information allocation.
To provide some intuition, suppose, contrarily, that there exists a stochastic information allocation (S 1 , S 2 , µ) with a strictly smaller bonus b < b AI that uniquely implements the full-effort profile. As a necessary condition for this unique implementation, there must exist some agent i and some signal s i ∈ S i such that, even if the other agent works with probability zero, an agent still prefers to work. Therefore,
where q is the conditional probability that the state is H given i observes s i . Or equivalently, b ≥ c q∆p H (1) + (1 − q)∆p L (1) .
Note that the right-hand side is decreasing in q and coincides with b AI when q = 1. This contradicts b < b AI . Therefore, we conclude that there is no stochastic information allocation that is strictly better than the deterministic asymmetric information allocation.
Conclusion
This paper considers a team-production model with state uncertainty. When the principal's goal is to uniquely implement desired effort choices, we show that, under certain conditions, asymmetrically informing the agents is the optimal information allocation. The main intuition is that by allocating information asymmetrically, it becomes less costly to avoid badly coordinated equilibria. As the degree of effort complementarity (called the effort effect in this paper) increases, asymmetric information allocation tends to improve. On the other hand, informing an agent is always costly in the sense that this agent must be incentivized even in a low state. As the state effect on the success probability function increases, asymmetric information allocation tends to worsen. Therefore, the optimal information allocation is determined by the relative magnitude of the two effects.
While we show the robustness of this main intuition in a number of extensions and generalizations, further research is necessary for a more comprehensive understanding of desirable information allocation in organizations. We believe that the analysis in this paper can serve as a useful benchmark for future research.
A Proof of Proposition 4
Let b represent any bonus contract such that (0, . . . , 0) is not an equilibrium. Then, we have b > c ∆p φ (1) . Note that this is a necessary condition for uniquely implementing the full-effort profile (1, . . . , 1).
Conversely, given any b such that b > c ∆p φ (1) , it is strictly dominant for each agent to make a high effort. Therefore, the full-effort profile is the unique equilibrium.
B Proof of Proposition 5
Let (e U , (e IH , e IL )) represent a strategy profile such that all the uninformed agents play e U , and all the informed agents play e IH in state H and play e IL in state L. We first show the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let b be any bonus contract such that neither (0, (0, 0)), (0, (1, 0)), nor (1, (1, 0) 
∆p H (1) as its necessary condition. Given b > c ∆p H (1) , to prevent (0, (1, 0)) from being an equilibrium, we must (1, 0) ) from being an equilibrium, we must have b > c ∆p L (m+1) .
Note that b >b is a necessary condition for uniquely implementing the full-effort profile (1, (1, 1) ). Now, we show that, conversely, (1, (1, 1) ) is uniquely implemented by any b such that b >b. First, because b > c ∆p H (1) , it is strictly dominant for each informed agent to make a high effort in state H. Given this, because b > c f ∆p H (n−m+1)+(1−f )∆p L (1) , it is (iteratively) strictly dominant for each uninformed agent to make a high effort. Given this, because b > c ∆p L (m+1) , it is (iteratively) strictly dominant for each informed agent to make a high effort even in state L. Therefore, (1, (1, 1) ) is the unique strategy profile that survives iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies and, hence, it is a unique equilibrium.
C Proof of Theorem 2
The statement (i) is trivial. For the statement (ii), recall first that, for m = 1, . . . , n−1, b m = max{ c ∆p L (m+1) , For the statement (iii), observe first that, for any m = 1, . . . , n − 1, we
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we have b n < b m for all m > 1 if and only if b n < b n−1 , or equivalently,
and hence we obtain the inequality as in the statement.
D Proof of Proposition 6
First, for e = (0, 0) not to be an equilibrium, we must have b > c i ∆p φ (1) at least for some i so that the agent will make a high effort even if the other agent does not. Given c 1 < c 2 , we obtain b > c1 ∆p φ (1) . Also, for e = (1, 1) to be an equilibrium, we must have b ≥ max i c i ∆p φ (2) . Given c 1 < c 2 , we obtain b ≥ c2 ∆p φ (2) . Therefore, we obtain b > b NI as a necessary condition for uniquely implementing e = (1, 1).
Conversely, b > b NI is also sufficient for unique implementation. First, e 1 = 1 is strictly dominant for agent 1 because b > c1 ∆p φ (1) . Given this, e 2 = 1 is (iteratively) strictly dominant for agent 2 because b > c2 ∆p φ (2) .
E Proof of Proposition 7
We only consider the case with
} is similar and, hence, the proof is omitted.
We have
As in the base case in Section 3, if b > b 2 AI , then the full-effort strategy profile is the unique equilibrium when agent 2 is informed: first, it is strictly dominant for (informed) agent 2 to make a high effort in the high state, even if agent 1 does not work; given this, a high effort is (iteratively) strictly dominant for (uninformed) agent 1; given this, a high effort in any state is (iteratively) strictly dominant for agent 2.
Conversely, b > b 2
AI is also necessary to uniquely implement the full-effort strategy profile when agent 2 is informed. First, to prevent e = (0, (0, 0)) from being an equilibrium, the least costly way is to incentivize (informed) agent 2 in the high state as long as c1 ∆p φ (1) ≥ c2 ∆p H (1) . This last inequality is satisfied because c1 c2 ≥ γ * = max{
∆p H (1) . Second, to prevent e = (0, (1, 0)) from being an equilibrium, the least costly way is to incentivize (uninformed) agent 1. Therefore, we must have b > c1 f ∆p H (2)+(1−f )∆p L (1) . Finally, to prevent e = (1, (1, 0) ) from being an equilibrium, agent 2 must be incentivized in the low state. Therefore, b > c2 ∆p L (2) . These three inequalities amount to b > b 2 AI .
F Proof of Theorem 3
The case with c1 c2 ≥ γ * is straightforward and, hence, we omit the proof. Therefore, in the following, we assume c1 c2 < γ * . Moreover, we only consider the case with
The other case is similar and, hence, the proof for that case is omitted.
Lemma 3. Whenever agent 1 is informed, any bonus contract b that uniquely implements the full-effort strategy profile e = ((1, 1), 1) must satisfy b > b NI = max{ c1 ∆p φ (1) , c2 ∆p φ (2) }, and, therefore, the no-information scenario is better than informing agent 1.
Proof. (of the lemma) First, we consider the case with c1 ∆p L (1) ≥ c2 f ∆p H (2)+(1−f )∆p L (1) . In this case, to prevent e = ((1, 0), 0) from being an equilibrium, the least costly way is to incentivize agent 2 by setting b > c2 f ∆p H (2)+(1−f )∆p L (1) . As in the base case, to prevent e = ((0, 0), 0) and e = ((1, 0), 1) from being equilibria, the least costly way is to incentivize agent 1 by setting
where the equality and the last inequality is because of our current assumption that
∆p φ (2) and, moreover, together with c1
. In this case, to prevent e = ((1, 0), 0) from being an equilibrium, the least costly way is to incentivize agent 1 in the low state by setting b > c1 ∆p L (1) . To prevent e = ((1, 1), 0) from being an equilibrium, we must have b > c2 ∆p φ (2) . These two inequalities imply b > max{ c2
Lemma 4. Whenever agent 2 is informed, any bonus contract b that uniquely implements the full-effort strategy profile e = (1, (1, 1) ) must satisfy b > b NI = max{ c1 ∆p φ (1) , c2 ∆p φ (2) }, and, therefore, the no-information scenario is better than informing agent 2.
Proof. (of the lemma)
To prevent e = (1, (1, 0) ) from being an equilibrium, we must have b > c2 ∆p L (2) . First, we consider the case with 1 ∆p H (1) < 1 ∆p L (2) (hence, γ * = ∆p φ (1) ∆p L (2) ). In this case, c1 c2 < γ * implies c2 1) . Therefore, to prevent e = (0, (0, 0)) from being an equilibrium, the least costly way is to incentivize agent 1 by setting b > c1 ∆p φ (1) , which is our desired inequality.
G Proof of Proposition 8
We first show the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Let b be any bonus contract such that neither (0, 0), (1, 0), nor (0, 1) are equilibria. Then, either (i) b 1 > c ∆p φ (1) and b 2 > c ∆p φ (2) , or (ii) b 1 > c ∆p φ (2) and b 2 > c ∆p φ (1) .
Proof. Let b be any bonus contract such that (0, 0) are not equilibria. Then, we must have b i > c ∆p φ (1) for some agent i. Given any b = (b i , b j ) such that b i > c ∆p φ (1) , to prevent e = (e i , e j ) = (1, 0) from being an equilibrium, we must have b i > c ∆p φ (1) for j ̸ = i.
Note that this is a necessary condition for uniquely implementing the full-effort profile (1, 1). Conversely, consider any b such that b 1 > c ∆p φ (1) and b 2 > c ∆p φ (2) . First, it is strictly dominant for agent 1 to make a high effort. Then, given this, it is (iteratively) strictly dominant for agent 2 to make a high effort. Therefore, the full-effort profile is the unique equilibrium. The case where b satisfies b 1 > c ∆p φ (2) and b 2 > c ∆p φ (1) is analogous, and so we omit this case.
H Proof of Proposition 9
We first show the following lemma. Lemma 6. Let b be any bonus contract such that neither (0, (0, 0)), (0, (1, 0)), (1, (1, 0)), nor (0, (1, 1)) are equilibria. Then, either (I) b 1 > c ∆p φ (1) and b 2 > c ∆p L (2) , (II) b 1 > c f ∆p H (2)+(1−f )∆p L (1) and b 2 > max{ c ∆p H (1) , c ∆p L (2) }, or (III) b 1 > c ∆p φ (2) and b 2 > c ∆p L (1) .
Proof. For any b such that (0, (0, 0)) is not an equilibrium, we must have either (i) b 1 > c ∆p φ (1) , or (ii) b 2 > c ∆p H (1) . First, consider any b such that b 1 > c ∆p φ (1) . To prevent (1, (1, 0) ) from being an equilibrium, we must have b 2 > c ∆p L (2) . Hence, we obtain Case (I).
Second, consider any b such that b 2 > c ∆p H (1) . To prevent (0, (1, 0)) from being an equilibrium, we must have either (ii-a) b 1 > c f ∆p H (2)+(1−f )∆p L (1) or (ii-b) b 2 > c ∆p L (1) . Consider any b such that b 2 > c ∆p H (1) and b 1 > c f ∆p H (2)+(1−f )∆p L (1) . To prevent (1, (1, 0) ) from being an equilibrium, we must have b 2 > c ∆p L (2) . Hence, we obtain Case (II).
Finally, consider any b such that (b 2 > c ∆p H (1) and) b 2 > c ∆p L (1) . To prevent (0, (1, 1)) from being an equilibrium, we must have b 1 > c ∆p φ (2) . Hence, we obtain Case (III).
Note that this is a necessary condition for uniquely implementing the full-effort profile (1, 1).
We now show that the converse is true. First, consider any b such that b 1 > c ∆p φ (1) and b 2 > c ∆p L (2) . It is strictly dominant for the uninformed agent to make a high effort. Given this, it is (iteratively) strictly dominant for the informed agent to make a high effort for any state. Therefore, (1, (1, 1) ) is a unique equilibrium.
Second, consider any b such that b 1 > c f ∆p H (2)+(1−f )∆p L (1) and b 2 > max{ c ∆p H (1) , c ∆p L (2) }. Because b 2 > c ∆p H (1) , it is strictly dominant for the informed agent to make a high effort in state H. Given this, it is (iteratively) strictly dominant for the uninformed agent to make a high effort. Given this, because b 2 > c ∆p L (2) , it is (iteratively) strictly dominant for the informed agent to make a high effort in state L. Therefore, (1, (1, 1) ) is a unique equilibrium.
Third, consider any b such that b 1 > c ∆p φ (2) and b 2 > c ∆p L (1) . It is strictly dominant for the informed agent to make a high effort in any state. Given this, it is (iteratively) strictly dominant for the uninformed agent to make a high effort. Therefore, (1, (1, 1) ) is a unique equilibrium.
I Proof of Theorem 4
The first statement is trivial, hence, we omit its proof. To prove the second statement, first, assume
Then,
, then the no-information scenario is better.
If b AI = ( c ∆p φ (1) , c ∆p L (2) ), then the no-information scenario is better because (b 1,AI + b 2,AI − (b 1,N I + b 1,N I ) = f (∆p H (2) − ∆p L (2)) ∆p φ (2)∆p L (2) ≥ 0.
Finally, if b AI = ( c ∆p φ (2) , c ∆p L (1) ), then the no-information scenario is better because (b 1,AI + b 2,AI ) − (b 1,N I + b 2,N I ) = f (∆p H (1) − ∆p L (1)) ∆p φ (1)∆p L (1) ≥ 0.
J Proof of Theorem 5
The proof is composed of two steps. First, we show that the no-information scenario is better than any (possibly stochastic) symmetric information allocation. Next, we show that there is a stochastic (asymmetric) information allocation that is strictly better than the no-information scenario.
